📌 Draft

AIP-3: Digital Asset Provenance and Ownership Tracking

Blockchain-native intellectual property system providing tamper-proof ownership records, version control, and transfer capabilities for digital assets.

Authors	Aerium Team [info@aerium.network]
Discussion	View Discussion AIP-3
Category	Core
Created	2025-10-14

Abstract

This proposal introduces a native Layer-1 transaction type for the Aerium blockchain that enables decentralized intellectual property registration, ownership tracking, and provenance management without relying on smart contracts. The system implements a privacy-preserving hash-based proof mechanism using BLAKE2b ¹ cryptographic functions to ensure data integrity while maintaining confidentiality of asset content. The proposed “DAS” (Digital Asset System) system supports comprehensive metadata management with optional fields including title, content type, public links, and file size, while maintaining a mandatory version control system that creates an immutable chain of ownership and modifications similar to distributed version control systems.

The implementation leverages cryptographic signatures (Ed25519/Secp256k1) ² to establish proof of ownership and authenticity, with transaction sizes optimized to range from 121 bytes for minimal registrations to 558 bytes for full transfers including complete metadata. Unlike existing NFT-based solutions that require smart contract overhead, this native approach provides superior performance, lower costs, and enhanced privacy through selective metadata disclosure. The system addresses key challenges in digital asset management by providing tamper-proof ownership records, complete version history tracking, and seamless ownership transfer capabilities while preserving user privacy and maintaining blockchain efficiency.

This framework establishes a foundation for decentralized intellectual property management that can serve various use cases including digital art provenance, software licensing, academic publication tracking, and creative content ownership verification, positioning Aerium as a blockchain platform specifically optimized for intellectual property applications.

Motivation

The exponential growth of digital assets and intellectual property in blockchain ecosystems has created an urgent need for native, efficient ownership tracking mechanisms. Current solutions face several critical limitations:

Privacy vs Transparency Trade-offs: Traditional blockchain systems offer complete transparency at the expense of privacy, while full zero-knowledge proof systems provide maximum privacy but introduce prohibitive computational overhead unsuitable for high-throughput environments. Neither approach adequately serves creators who need selective privacy with transparent ownership history.

Validator Complexity: Existing solutions require complex validation logic that strains network resources. The computational overhead of verifying smart contract states or full zero-knowledge proofs significantly impacts network performance.

This proposal addresses these challenges by introducing a native Layer-1 transaction type that combines the simplicity of traditional cryptographic proofs with selective privacy features. Unlike full zero-knowledge systems that hide all information, our approach enables creators to selectively disclose metadata while maintaining content privacy through cryptographic hashing.

The proposed system draws inspiration from distributed version control systems like Git, providing linear versioning with clear ownership transitions. This familiar paradigm reduces complexity for both implementers and users while ensuring efficient validation by network participants.

Specification

This specification formalizes the design and mechanism for three native Layer-1 transaction types dedicated to Intellectual Property (IP) Provenance and Ownership Tracking on the Aerium blockchain. It ensures efficient, secure, and privacy-preserving registration, versioning, and transfer of digital assets, with a focus on simplicity, scalability, and cryptographic integrity.

Transaction Type Definition

Current Aerium Transaction Types

Currently, transactions in Aerium support the following payload types:

• Transfer Payload (PayloadType: 1) - Native token transfers between addresses
• Bond Payload (PayloadType: 2) - Validator staking operations
• Sortition Payload (PayloadType: 3) - Consensus participation mechanism
• Unbond Payload (PayloadType: 4) - Validator unstaking operations
• Withdraw Payload (PayloadType: 5) - Reward withdrawal operations
• Batch Transfer Payload (PayloadType: 6) - Multiple transfers in single transaction

New “DAS” (Digital Asset System) Payload Types

This AIP proposes the addition of four new payload types for intellectual property management:

• IP Mint Payload (PayloadType: 7) - Initial intellectual property registration
• IP Update Payload (PayloadType: 8) - Content or metadata modification while preserving ownership
• IP Transfer Payload (PayloadType: 9) - Ownership transfer to a new address
• IP Burn Payload (PayloadType: 10) - Permanent destruction of IP ownership

This approach provides zero ambiguity, compile-time type safety, and optimal payload sizes while maintaining perfect alignment with Aerium’s existing architecture patterns.

Content ID System

The “DAS” (Digital Asset System) introduces a Content ID system that provides stable, permanent identification for intellectual property assets across their entire lifecycle.

Content ID Generation:

\[ContentID = BLAKE2b-256(InitialContentHash || Owner || BlockNumber)\]

Where:

• InitialContentHash: BLAKE2b-256 hash of original file content
• Owner: Address of initial owner (21 bytes)
• BlockNumber: Block number of mint transaction (lock time, 4 bytes, big-endian)

Content ID Properties:

• Permanent: Never changes throughout IP lifecycle
• Unique: Cryptographically guaranteed uniqueness
• Deterministic: Can be reproduced given mint transaction data

Version Control Semantics

The “DAS” (Digital Asset System) implements semantic version control where version numbers have clear, specific meaning:

Version Increment Rules:

Action	Version Rule	Description
Mint	= 0	First registration
Update	+1	Content or metadata changed
Transfer	= current	Ownership change only
Burn	+1	Final irreversible state

Rationale: This approach follows industry standards where version numbers reflect content changes, not ownership changes. Similar to Git commits (content changes) vs. repository ownership transfers (no new commit), or patent numbers (constant) vs. patent ownership (transferable).

Payload Size Analysis

Operation	Fixed Fields	Optional Metadata	Total Range
IP Mint	185 bytes	0-372 bytes	185-557 bytes
IP Update	217 bytes	0-372 bytes	217-589 bytes
IP Transfer	240 bytes	0-372 bytes	240-622 bytes
IP Burn	221 bytes	0-100 bytes	221-321 bytes

Payload Structures

All “DAS” (Digital Asset System) operations share the following metadata fields for selective privacy control:

Field	Type	Size	Description	Required
Metadata.Title	string	100 Bytes	Asset title (UTF-8, ~50-100 characters)	*1
Metadata.Size	uint64	8 Bytes	File size in bytes	*1
Metadata.ContentType	string	64 Bytes	MIME type (RFC 6838 compliant 3)	*1
Metadata.PublicLink	string	200 Bytes	Public access URL	*2

Privacy Notes:

• *1: Optional metadata field - can be omitted for privacy control
• *2: Optional public link field - can be omitted to maintain content location privacy

On‑chain Optional Metadata Layout (372 bytes)

• Fixed slots in order: Title (100 bytes), Size (8 bytes, uint64 big‑endian), ContentType (64 bytes), PublicLink (200 bytes).
• If a field is omitted, its entire slot MUST be all zero bytes.
• Strings: UTF‑8, NFC normalized, left‑justified, NUL (0x00) padded to slot size. Truncate at the last complete code point that fits.
• Size: uint64 big‑endian.
• The total block is always present (372 bytes); omission is signaled by zeroed slots.

Supported URL Formats

The PublicLink field supports both centralized and decentralized storage:

• IPFS Protocol: ipfs://QmXXXXX... (46+ characters)
• IPFS HTTP Gateway: https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmXXXXX... (65+ characters)
• IPFS Custom Gateway: https://gateway.pinata.cloud/ipfs/QmXXXXX... (80+ characters)
• Standard HTTP/HTTPS: Custom URLs for traditional hosting

1. IP Mint Payload (PayloadType: 7)

Purpose: Initial registration of intellectual property with permanent Content ID assignment

Payload Structure:

Field	Type	Size	Description	Required
ContentID	Hash	32 Bytes	Permanent IP identifier (generated deterministically)	✅
Owner	Address	21 Bytes	Initial owner address	✅
ContentHash	Hash	32 Bytes	BLAKE2b-256 hash of file content	✅
MetadataHash	Hash	32 Bytes	BLAKE2b-256 hash of serialized metadata	✅
Version	uint32	4 Bytes	Sequential version number (must be 0)	✅
Signature	Bytes	64 Bytes	Ed25519/ECDSA signature of computed ProofHash	✅
Optional Metadata	Various	372 Bytes	Title, Size, ContentType, PublicLink	*1, *2

Validation Rules:

• Version MUST equal 0
• ContentID MUST be unique (not previously registered)
• ContentID MUST be calculated correctly from initial content and owner
• Owner becomes initial IP owner

ProofHash Calculation:

\[ProofHash_{MINT} = H(ContentID \parallel ContentHash \parallel MetadataHash \parallel Version)\]

2. IP Update Payload (PayloadType: 8)

Purpose: Content or metadata modification while preserving ownership and Content ID

Payload Structure:

Field	Type	Size	Description	Required
ContentID	Hash	32 Bytes	Permanent IP identifier (unchanged from mint)	✅
Owner	Address	21 Bytes	Current owner address	✅
ContentHash	Hash	32 Bytes	BLAKE2b-256 hash of file content	✅
MetadataHash	Hash	32 Bytes	BLAKE2b-256 hash of serialized metadata	✅
Version	uint32	4 Bytes	Sequential version number (previous + 1)	✅
PreviousHash	Hash	32 Bytes	Hash of previous IP transaction	✅
Signature	Bytes	64 Bytes	Ed25519/ECDSA signature of computed ProofHash	✅
Optional Metadata	Various	372 Bytes	Title, Size, ContentType, PublicLink	*1, *2

Validation Rules:

• ContentID MUST match existing IP state
• Version MUST equal CurrentState.Version + 1
• Owner MUST equal current owner in state
• PreviousHash MUST equal CurrentState.LastTransactionHash
• ContentHash MAY change (content update) or remain same (metadata-only update)
• IP MUST NOT be in BURNED status

ProofHash Calculation:

\[ProofHash_{UPDATE} = H(ContentID \parallel ContentHash \parallel MetadataHash \parallel Version \parallel PreviousHash)\]

3. IP Transfer Payload (PayloadType: 9)

Purpose: Ownership transfer to a new address while maintaining Content ID and version

Payload Structure:

Field	Type	Size	Description	Required
ContentID	Hash	32 Bytes	Permanent IP identifier (unchanged from mint)	✅
Owner	Address	21 Bytes	Current owner address	✅
ContentHash	Hash	32 Bytes	BLAKE2b-256 hash of file content	✅
MetadataHash	Hash	32 Bytes	BLAKE2b-256 hash of serialized metadata	✅
Version	uint32	4 Bytes	Current version number (unchanged)	✅
PreviousHash	Hash	32 Bytes	Hash of previous IP transaction	✅
NewOwnerAddr	Address	21	New IP owner	✅
Signature	Bytes	64 Bytes	Ed25519/ECDSA signature of computed ProofHash	✅
Optional Metadata	Various	372 Bytes	Title, Size, ContentType, PublicLink	*1, *2

Validation Rules:

• ContentID MUST match existing IP state
• Version MUST equal CurrentState.Version (NO increment)
• Owner MUST equal current owner in state
• PreviousHash MUST equal CurrentState.LastTransactionHash
• NewOwnerAddr MUST be valid address (21 bytes)
• IP MUST NOT be in BURNED status

ProofHash Calculation:

\[ProofHash_{TRANSFER} = H(ContentID \parallel ContentHash \parallel MetadataHash \parallel Version \parallel PreviousHash \parallel NewOwnerAddr)\]

Transfer Semantics: The transfer operation changes ownership but preserves the content version. This ensures that version numbers have semantic meaning related to content changes, not ownership changes. The new owner receives the IP at its current content version.

4. IP Burn Payload (PayloadType: 10)

Purpose: Permanent destruction of IP ownership, preventing all future operations

Payload Structure:

Field	Type	Size	Description	Required
ContentID	Hash	32 Bytes	Permanent IP identifier	✅
Owner	Address	21 Bytes	Current owner address	✅
Version	uint32	4 Bytes	Sequential version number (previous + 1)	✅
PreviousHash	Hash	32 Bytes	Hash of previous IP transaction	✅
BurnReason	string	100 Bytes	Optional reason for destruction (UTF-8)	*3
Signature	Bytes	64 Bytes	Ed25519/ECDSA signature of computed ProofHash	✅

Privacy Notes:

• *3: Optional burn reason - can be omitted or zeroed for privacy

Validation Rules:

• ContentID MUST match existing IP state
• Version MUST equal CurrentState.Version + 1
• Owner MUST equal current owner in state
• PreviousHash MUST equal CurrentState.LastTransactionHash
• IP MUST NOT already be in BURNED status
• Only current owner can burn IP

Effects of Burn Operation:

• No future Update, Transfer, or Burn operations allowed
• IP becomes permanently frozen and unusable
• All historical data remains accessible for provenance

ProofHash Calculation:

\[ProofHash_{BURN} = H(ContentID \parallel Version \parallel PreviousHash \parallel BurnReason)\]

Use Cases for IP Burn:

• Copyright Expiration: When legal protection period ends
• Voluntary Relinquishment: Owner chooses to release ownership
• Legal Compliance: Court orders or regulatory requirements
• Asset Retirement: Business decision to retire digital assets
• Privacy Protection: Permanent removal from active circulation

Cryptographic Specifications

Hash Function

Primary Hash Function: BLAKE2b-256

• Output Size: 32 bytes (256 bits)
• Performance: ~1 GB/s on modern hardware
• Security: Cryptographically secure, collision-resistant

Content Hash Calculation

The ContentHash provides tamper-evident identification of file content:

\[ContentHash = H(FileContent)\]

Metadata Hash Calculation

The MetadataHash ensures metadata integrity and supports selective disclosure:

\[MetadataHash = \begin{cases} H(CBOR(Metadata)) & \text{if } Metadata \neq \emptyset \\ 0^{32} & \text{if } Metadata = \emptyset \end{cases}\]

Security Considerations

The “DAS” (Digital Asset System) system introduces new attack surfaces and security considerations beyond standard cryptocurrency transactions. The unique requirements of intellectual property management—including content integrity, ownership verification, version control, and selective privacy—necessitate specialized security analysis and protection mechanisms.

Hash Function Security

BLAKE2b-256 Analysis:

• Collision Resistance: 2^128 theoretical collision resistance provides adequate security for IP content identification
• Preimage Resistance: 2^256 preimage resistance prevents attackers from finding content that matches a given hash
• Performance: High-speed hashing (~1 GB/s) minimizes computational overhead while maintaining security

Hash Chain Integrity:

The sequential hash chaining through PreviousHash creates a tamper-evident audit trail where modification of any historical transaction becomes computationally infeasible without detection.

Digital Signature Security

Ed25519 Security Properties:

• Key Security: 128-bit equivalent security level against classical computers
• Signature Uniqueness: Deterministic signatures prevent signature malleability attacks
• Side-Channel Resistance: Constant-time implementation prevents timing attacks

ECDSA secp256k1 Compatibility:

• Bitcoin Compatibility: Enables integration with existing Bitcoin/Ethereum infrastructure
• Security Level: 128-bit equivalent security with proper implementation
• Malleability Concerns: Requires canonical signature encoding to prevent transaction malleability

Signature Encoding Requirements

• Ed25519: fixed 64‑byte signature.
• secp256k1: fixed 64‑byte compact (R∥S), low‑S normalized; DER is NOT permitted in this payload.
• The signature scheme MUST be unambiguously derivable from the transaction envelope.

Content-Related Attacks

1. Content Hash Collision Attack

• Description: Attacker attempts to create different content with identical BLAKE2b hash
• Probability: Success requires ~2^128 operations (collision probability per random attempt is approximately 2^-128)
• Impact: Could enable content substitution without detection
• Mitigation: BLAKE2b-256 provides sufficient collision resistance; monitor for hash function advances

2. Content Preimage Attack

• Description: Attacker attempts to reverse-engineer original content from hash
• Probability: ~2^-256 (computationally infeasible)
• Impact: Could expose private content
• Mitigation: Hash function preimage resistance; content remains private off-chain

3. Rainbow Table Attack

• Description: Precomputed hash tables to identify common content
• Probability: High for common/small content
• Impact: Could reveal content patterns or common files
• Mitigation: Content salting not applicable; rely on content uniqueness and off-chain privacy

Ownership and Authorization Attacks

4. Private Key Compromise

• Description: Attacker gains access to owner’s private key
• Probability: Depends on key management practices
• Impact: Complete loss of IP ownership control
• Mitigation:
  • Hardware wallet integration
  • Multi-signature schemes (future enhancement)
  • Key rotation mechanisms
  • Secure key generation and storage practices

5. Signature Replay Attack

• Description: Reusing valid signatures across different contexts
• Probability: Medium without proper implementation
• Impact: Unauthorized transactions using legitimate signatures
• Mitigation:
  • Chain-specific address derivation
  • Transaction nonces and unique transaction hashes
  • Time-based signature expiration (future enhancement)

6. Man-in-the-Middle Attack

• Description: Interception and modification of transactions before broadcast
• Probability: Medium in unsecured network environments
• Impact: Transaction manipulation or substitution
• Mitigation:
  • End-to-end transaction encryption
  • Secure communication channels (TLS)
  • Transaction integrity verification before signing

Blockchain-Specific Attacks

7. Double Spending Attack

• Description: Attempting to transfer the same IP to multiple parties
• Probability: Low due to blockchain consensus
• Impact: Ownership ambiguity and fraud
• Mitigation:
  • Consensus mechanism finality requirements
  • Multiple confirmation requirements for high-value IPs
  • Real-time state validation

8. Front-Running Attack

• Description: Attackers observe pending transactions and submit competing transactions
• Probability: Medium in high-congestion periods
• Impact: Registration interference or transaction ordering manipulation
• Mitigation:
  • Commit-reveal schemes for sensitive operations
  • Private mempool implementations
  • Fair ordering mechanisms

9. MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) Exploitation

• Description: Validators extracting value through transaction ordering
• Probability: Medium to High depending on network design
• Impact: Unfair transaction ordering affecting IP registration races
• Mitigation:
  • Fair sequencing protocols
  • Encrypted mempool designs
  • MEV mitigation through protocol design

Metadata and Privacy Attacks

10. Metadata Analysis Attack

• Description: Inferring private information from public metadata patterns
• Probability: High with sufficient transaction analysis
• Impact: Privacy breach and behavioral pattern exposure
• Mitigation:
  • Optional metadata fields
  • Metadata anonymization techniques
  • Traffic analysis resistance measures

11. Correlation Attack

• Description: Linking multiple IPs to the same owner through address reuse
• Probability: High without address management
• Impact: Loss of pseudonymity and privacy
• Mitigation:
  • Address rotation recommendations
  • Hierarchical deterministic (HD) wallet integration
  • Privacy-preserving address schemes

12. Selective Disclosure Manipulation

• Description: Inconsistent metadata disclosure creating information asymmetry
• Probability: High due to user control over metadata
• Impact: Market manipulation or unfair information advantage
• Mitigation:
  • Clear metadata policies
  • Standardized disclosure practices
  • Marketplace governance mechanisms

Use Cases

• Digital art provenance and resale tracking
• Software license lifecycle
• Academic publication verification

References

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.